

CAN THE FRONTLINE STATES  
ESCAPE APARTHEID'S STRANGLEHOLD?

# **THE STRUGGLE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA**

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## Abbreviations

ANC (SA) African National Congress of South Africa.  
FAPLA Angolan Defence Force.  
FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola.  
Frelimo Mozambique Liberation Front.  
MPLA People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola.  
MRN Resistance Movement of Mozambique.  
OAU Organisation of African Unity.  
PAC Pan Africanist Congress.  
SADCC Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference.  
SADF South African Defence Force.  
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.  
ZANU(PF) Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front).  
ZAPU Zimbabwe African Peoples Union.

## Foreword


by *Alan Sapper*, General Secretary, Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT).

This unique publication re-emphasises the need for the world struggle against apartheid and reflects the true aspirations of the black people of Southern Africa.

It is clear from this publication that South Africa can only exist by playing a dominant and generally oppressive role over the whole southern half of the African continent. Yet such illegal intervention against South Africa's neighbours is totally dependent on the economic investment by, particularly, the United Kingdom and economic and military aid from other countries.

Despite the continuing opposition of the minority regime against the majority black population, and the continuing support of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, a policy designed effectively to aid the liberation of that country is developing.

The two wings of the co-ordinating opposition to apartheid, economic unity of the front-line states (SADCC) and Western boycott of oil, arms and other commodities, inevitably stimulate an effective opposition to the apartheid system's destruction of human rights — a destruction that the world cannot for much longer countenance. *The Struggle For Southern Africa* is essential reading for all who support the battle for democracy and genuine independence for the people of Southern Africa.



## Introduction

South Africa has stated repeatedly that she has embarked on a "total strategy" designed to defeat all those fighting against apartheid. Within the Republic this has led to ameliorations for a small minority of blacks, while the majority face increasing repression. Beyond her borders, South Africa aims to use a sophisticated combination of economic leverage, military might and political destabilisation to undermine the ability and willingness of her neighbours to support the liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa.

This publication has been written to focus attention on South Africa's impact on the independent states of southern Africa. As one US State Department Report on this subject put it, "South Africa has a variety of arrows in her quiver," and her continuing readiness to invade her neighbours is demonstrated by the recent raids into Angola and Mozambique. With the help of the United States and West Germany, South Africa in all probability now has a military nuclear capability, and her aggression thus takes on an even more deadly significance.

Yet military intervention is only the obvious aspect of South Africa's hold over the region. The economic and political threat that the regime represents to her neighbours is frequently underestimated, while South Africa's activities tend to be viewed as single events. The following events took place during the first three months of 1981:

- \* On 3rd January, Prime Minister Mugabe accused South Africa of recruiting former members of the Rhodesian Army in a continuing effort to destabilise southern Africa, saying "We remain worried that our borders are being made increasingly insecure by South Africa."
- \* On 30th January, South African forces attacked Matola in Mozambique, killing twelve members of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC).
- \* On 25th February, a bomb was discovered wired to the car of a representative of the ANC in Salisbury.
- \* On 10th March Prime Minister Botha threatened to cut off grain supplies to South Africa's neighbours if they continued to support sanctions against the regime.

Taken in isolation each of these events represents a serious problem. Seen as part of a 'total strategy' designed to entrench South Africa's hold over the region, they represent a threat to independent southern Africa of appalling magnitude.

The first chapter of this study indicates the historical continuity of South Africa's purpose, which is an attempt to build a political framework onto the economic control she exerts over the sub-continent. Chapter Two examines the



military action and covert aggression practised by South Africa against the independent states of the region since the wars of liberation against the Portuguese empire and Rhodesian minority rule.

The third chapter discusses the extent of South Africa's direct and indirect influence over the economic life of the region. A distinction is made between the stranglehold exercised by the regime over the 'hostage states' of Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, and South Africa's more tenuous grip on Zambia or Tanzania. Chapter Four is concerned with South African links with Malawi, which demonstrate the kind of relationship South Africa would like to forge with all the countries of the region. Malawi is unique in Africa in having full diplomatic relations with the Republic, and her relationship with South Africa poses serious problems for the independent states of southern Africa in their attempt to exert pressure on the apartheid regime, since they have a fifth column in their midst. For these reasons, and because little information is generally available on Malawi, the country is dealt with at some length.

The final chapter looks at some of the alternatives proposed to South African influence. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference is one such alternative, bringing together the states concerned in an attempt to reach a common approach to their mutual economic difficulties. We consider briefly whether this kind of unity can be extended to a form of collective military security.

In undertaking this study, we have considered South Africa's impact on her independent neighbours, we have therefore not dealt with the fiercest of all conflict in southern Africa — the liberation struggle in Namibia.

This territory is held in a state of illegal subjugation by South Africa, whose over 60,000 troops occupy Namibia in violation of international law. The occupation is sharply contested by the people of Namibia, under the leadership of the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO). However, South Africa continues to administer Namibia as an integral part of its territory, and this separates it from the rest of the subcontinent which has achieved a political independence now threatened by South Africa.

The scope of this study is large, and it has only been possible to deal with some of the material available within a limited space. We hope that despite its limitations this study will focus attention on South Africa's "total strategy" and the need for united opposition to it.

## Chapter One

### South Africa's ambition: a Constellation of States

While the internal oppression brought about by apartheid is generally known and universally condemned, South Africa's impact on her neighbours is less widely understood. The military and economic might of South Africa casts a giant shadow over the entire subcontinent. None of the countries of the region — Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe — are entirely free from her influence, while for some the influence is so far-reaching that their policy options are considerably restricted. This pamphlet attempts to describe South Africa's political, economic and military hold over her neighbours.

### The roots of South Africa's regional policies

As the colonial era drew to a close, South Africa — as the most powerful Commonwealth state in Africa — played an increasingly important role in guiding British Government policy. Successive South African governments envisaged a new form of power-sharing to replace imperial rule. Oswald Pirow, Minister of Defence in the Hertzog government of the 1930's, proposed a series of federations from South Africa to the Sudan, linked by a "common native policy" and, "directly flowing" from that, "a common defence policy."<sup>1</sup> In 1943, General Smuts suggested the reorganisation of the British Empire into "colonial groupings" in which neighbouring Dominions would act as "sharers and partners" in Empire.<sup>2</sup>

The assumption that South Africa would exercise a dominating influence over the rest of the continent acquired different character with the victory of the Nationalist Party in 1948. Soon after taking power, the new Prime Minister, Dr. Malan, proposed an Africa Charter, declaring that future development in Africa should follow the lines of "Western European Christian Civilisation". He advocated an African Defence Organisation to fight communism, and maintained that his party's doctrine of apartheid was the only possible basis for building stable race relations in Africa.

The growing abhorrence of apartheid and the rapid decolonisation of Africa brought the unequivocal rejection of South Africa's grandiose aims. The newly independent nations of Africa were united in their opposition to apartheid, and in 1961 South Africa was expelled from the Commonwealth. In 1969, the Organisation of African Unity adopted the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa. Its members pledged themselves to support the liberation of the subcontinent from all forms of racism, a policy which meant confrontation not only with South Africa



*Angolan victims of South African attack.*

and Rhodesia, but with Mozambique and Angola, then integral parts of the Portuguese Empire.

#### **The Vorster initiative.**

During the 1970's, certain African states decided to ignore the Lusaka Manifesto since it did not appear to be achieving results. Meanwhile, South Africa held out the promise of rich rewards in return for apparently limited diplomatic contacts. In September 1974, the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster, flew to the Ivory Coast to meet President Houphoet-Boigny; in February 1975, Vorster was in Monrovia for discussions with Liberia's President Tolbert. In April 1975, the South African Broadcasting Corporation could boast that in the past eighteen months, thirty African heads of state or ministers and 150 senior officials had visited South Africa. Vorster claimed that the alternative to a dialogue between South Africa and the rest of Africa was a military solution, something that he described as "too ghastly to contemplate".

Closer to home, South Africa was engaged in an intense diplomatic effort, primarily in conjunction with Zambia, to "solve" the Rhodesia problem. In August 1975 this culminated in a meeting between the leaders of the Rhodesian liberation movements and Ian Smith on the bridge over the Victoria Falls, under the watchful eyes of Vorster and Kaunda. The exercise failed, but the joint approach illustrated the degree to which cooperation had developed.

The Vorster policy foundered on two obstacles. To the surprise of most commentators, the Portuguese Empire, against which the liberation movements had waged a long and bitter campaign, collapsed with the revolt of the Armed Forces in 1974. During the struggle for control of the former Portuguese colonies, South Africa was not prepared to stand by and see firm bases of support for the liberation movements established on her borders, or on the borders of Namibia. In Mozambique, she encouraged the colonialists to carry out an unsuccessful coup, while in Angola she intervened directly (see Chapter 2); with Cuban aid the invasion was defeated and Angola became independent on 11th November 1975.

The second blow to the Vorster regime came in June 1976. Beginning with a student demonstration in Soweto, resistance and defiance swept South Africa. For four months the rebellion grew, culminating in general strikes in August and September. In the end, ruthless repression contained the revolt, but the repression was not without cost to the regime. Foreign and local capital, already nervous after the Angolan debacle, poured out of South Africa. Many thousands of black students fled South Africa, determined to meet armed repression on more equal terms. The dialogue policy, so carefully nurtured by Vorster, lay in ruins.

#### **The Botha Plan**

Although developments in 1974-6 were a severe setback, South Africa first stabilised the situation and then prepared a new offensive. By 1979, foreign capital had regained much of its confidence in South Africa. The international political

and economic situation pushed the gold price over \$700 per ounce (£315) by the end of the year. Taxation from gold mining alone jumped from £275m (R 477.4m) in 1977 to £540m (R 937.3m) in 1978, to an estimated £920m (R 1600m) in 1979.<sup>3</sup>

Early in 1979, Prime Minister Botha felt confident enough to dust off the plans that had been drawn up in the 1960's under Dr Verwoerd for a Southern African Common Market. Designed to ensure South African hegemony over the region, the Verwoerd plan had designated the area from South Africa to Zaire a "co-prosperity sphere". The aim was not only to give South Africa increased leverage over the region, but to guarantee her supplies of raw materials and labour, and a market for her industrial and agricultural exports.

The Botha plan, now named "A Constellation of States in southern Africa", was unveiled in March 1979 to a gathering of South African ambassadors in Zurich. It was reported that the aim was "... to draw into South Africa's orbit all Southern African states up to an including Zaire".<sup>4</sup> In November 1979 Botha publicly launched his initiative, appropriately enough at a business conference in Johannesburg.

The "Constellation" was to foster economic cooperation by removing restrictions on the flow of goods and services between the states concerned, as well as developing "the necessary social and physical infrastructure".<sup>5</sup> This was defined as including:

- coordination to promote direct economic relationships between the business sectors of the region;
- technical and financial cooperation;
- the promotion of investment;
- the coordination of wage and salary policies to avoid a brain drain from the peripheral areas;
- the coordination of economic and physical planning in terms of functional regions that often transcend international boundaries."<sup>6</sup>

In addition, regional cooperation was to include harmonising economic and fiscal policies, as well as extending to joint health services and plans for the advancement of tourism and the protection of natural resources. South African ambition knew no bounds.

Although the most grandiose schemes were for South Africa's "homelands", such as the Transkei, Botha made it plain that the scheme went far beyond this: "The membership of a constellation of Southern African states can include any country in the subcontinent which identifies the need to expand relationships and to cooperate in a regional context".<sup>7</sup> He went on to make it clear that in the new scheme of things private capital would have a special part to play: "Most of these possibilities fall within the scope of the private sector and in these cases the government's role is limited to the removal of constraints experienced by business concerns."<sup>8</sup>

Not surprisingly, businessmen were delighted. Never before had a South African government proposed such close links with private capital, especially in the

sensitive area of foreign relations. The Chairman of Anglo-American, the most important South African based multi-national, called the plan "imaginative", and said that it could be seen as "marking the beginning of a new relationship between Government and private enterprise".<sup>9</sup> He stressed that if businessmen were to invest in the constellation there would have to be guarantees against nationalisation. As another Anglo-American director put it: "Whether the states of the region like it or not, they have no choice but to accept the Prime Minister, Mr. P.W.Botha's proposals if they want southern Africa to have some possibility of advancing into the future on a reasonably stable social and economic basis."<sup>10</sup>

#### Notes to Chapter One

1 Geldenhuys, D. and Venter, D. "A Constellation of States: Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa", *International Affairs Bulletin*, Vol.3, No.3, December 1979. p.43.

2 *ibid.*

3 *South African Digest*, 25 January 1980.

4 *Rand Daily Mail*, 14 March 1979.

5 *Towards a Constellation of States in Southern Africa*, Text of a meeting between the Prime Minister and Business Leaders, Carlton Centre, Johannesburg, 22 November 1979, p16.

6 *ibid.* pp.16-17

7 *ibid.* p.20

8 *ibid.* p.22

9 *Rand Daily Mail*, 23 November 1979

10 *Sunday Times* (S.A.), 7 January 1980



## Chapter Two

### Military Intervention and Covert Action

South Africa's plans for a constellation of states should be seen in the context of her military aggression against the countries concerned.

For more than a decade, South Africa has been at war with her neighbours. South African security forces, in civil or military guise, have been used against people and governments to the north both in open military combat and in covert subversive activity.

The strategy behind this form of intervention has varied according to the political circumstances of the border countries. Before 1974, South Africa was concerned to shore up Portuguese rule in the colonies of Angola and Mozambique. Since their independence, South African intervention has been designed to undermine their radical regimes. In the former British colonies like Lesotho and Botswana, South African action is directed at preventing their governments from providing bases for the southern African liberation movements. In Zimbabwe, South Africa kept a military presence in the country as long as possible in an attempt to stop the Patriotic Front liberation movements coming to power. Since the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 and the electoral victory of ZANU(PF), South Africa's major strategic concern, as in the other former British colonies, appears to be that the government does not allow bases to the ANC(SA), the PAC or SWAPO.

South Africa's military intervention against her neighbours has had varying effects. Most of the newly independent countries had barely any army, small supplies of weapons, and were wide open to attack. The South African incursions have caused devastation, and laid a heavy burden of arms and defence spending on the underdeveloped economies of these states. But, however many arms these governments may secure on the international market, theirs is largely an unequal struggle for, unlike South Africa, none of them has the industrial infrastructure to develop a local arms industry. Moreover, South Africa's tactics of covert intervention and her frequent use of disaffected groups within the borders of other countries have tended to magnify political fissions, placing increased burdens on new administrations.

### Military invasion

#### Angola

The most spectacular of South Africa's military interventions and the first large-

scale use of South African troops beyond her borders since the Korean War, was the invasion of Angola in 1975. When the Portuguese left Angola there were three armed forces contending for control of the former colony. The People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), founded in 1956, followed a policy of a united front of all anti-imperialist forces against colonial rule. The National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) was an organisation based among the Bakongo people of north-western Angola with a strong regional interest. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) broke away from FNLA in 1964 to espouse, in radical rhetoric, the sectional interest of the Ovimbundu people of central Angola.

After the fall of the Portuguese government in 1974 South Africa attempted to prevent MPLA from taking power in Angola. She hoped that the South African Defence Force (SADF) could reach Luanda before November 11, independence day, and install FNLA and UNITA in the government. A second motive was to establish in southern Angola an area under South African control. In both these attempts South Africa was to fail. Early in 1975, South Africa secured through a small-scale attack an area in southern Angola in which UNITA forces could operate. The major South African invasion began in October 1975, when a joint UNITA-SADF column of troops crossed the Angolan border and advanced up the coast towards Luanda. This column was unable to advance further north than the mouth of the Queve River, which was reached on November 12. Attempts to consolidate the position were unsuccessful, and in January 1976 MPLA and Cuban forces drove the SADF south. In March 1976, all South African troops were withdrawn into Namibia.

Although South Africa had lost this battle against MPLA, she was not prepared to concede that she had lost the war to extend her influence into Angola. The incursion, had however, made plain that South Africa could not automatically rely on United States approval for exploits of this nature. When the invasion was planned, South Africa had received encouragement for the venture from the CIA. But recent revelations by the former head of CIA operations in Angola, Melvyn Stockwell, show that the CIA had warned South Africa that an invasion of Angola would not succeed.<sup>1</sup> The failure of the attack was accompanied by criticism of the intervention in the United States and Congress passed the Clark amendment forbidding US aid to the South Africans for use against Angola.

South Africa has never accepted the territorial sovereignty of Angola or the government of MPLA. Since 1976 UNITA has operated in southern Angola, using South African arms and supplies. South African troops have kept up a constant attack on Angola. In February 1981 Tenente-Coronel Ngonge, head of Intelligence and Reconnaissance in the Angolan army, FAPLA, summarised the nature of the South African attack:

"South Africa's main source of supremacy is its air force. The main feature of South African aggression is thus both bombing and shelling of both FAPLA

and civilian targets. Also attacks using heliborne troops with air force support. The air force bomb, and then troops are immediately dropped to massacre survivors."<sup>2</sup>

These attacks have caused grave loss of life and considerable damage to the resources of Angola. On 31 March 1976 the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 387, which condemned the first South African invasion and demanded South Africa pay Angola reparations for the damage caused, estimated at \$6 billion. South Africa ignored the resolution and no reparations have been paid. In 1979 Angola presented a document to the Security Council estimating further damage done by South African raids between May 1978 and July 1979 at \$100 million. A further document prepared by the Angolan government covering the period June 1979 to December 1980 estimated the damage done by South African attacks as \$230,996,805. The attacks had caused more than 100% more damage in these 18 months than in the previous year.

The attacks have led to the slaughter of cattle, the destruction of agricultural buildings and crops, the bombing of industrial enterprises, and the blowing up of railway lines, bridges and a tunnel in the Leba hills. Vehicles have been destroyed and damaged as have shops, markets, health centres, hospitals, schools and student hostels. In the period between March 1976 and December 1980 the Angolan Government recorded the casualties from the South African attacks as 1,868 dead and 2,548 wounded. These include soldiers, civilians, and Namibian, South African and Zimbabwean refugees. They do not cover the severe attacks on Namibian refugee camps in Angola in early 1981.

Bombing attacks and small troop incursions have been a constant feature of the South African onslaught, but in 1980 another full-scale invasion was launched. Four batallions of South African troops supported by three squadrons of Mirage bombers, two transport planes with paratroopers and twenty Puma helicopters crossed the border from Namibia and occupied the southern Cunene province. The scale of this attack surpassed even the 1975 expedition. According to the Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, its object was to destroy the command structure of SWAPO in southern Angola. After heavy fighting, FAPLA forced the South African army to retreat, but the cost was high. More than 387 Angolan civilians were recorded dead, together with 38 soldiers. SADF losses are unknown.

The tactics used by South Africa in most of her attacks were described by the Angolan Intelligence chief, Norongo:

"South Africa attacks civilians as its main target. Their aim is to create an empty zone, through massacres and abductions. Their intention is to substitute UNITA puppets on Angolan territory in an attempt to destabilise the economy of the south. After lightning attacks by South African forces, UNITA elements are left behind in the cleared zone."<sup>3</sup>

Some of these lightning attacks have been carried out by SADF troops, but an article in the *Guardian* of 29 January 1981 revealed that in southern Angola South

Africa was making extensive use of a secret unit known as the "Buffalo Regiment" or "32 Batallion", whose ranks were made up mainly of mercenaries. According to one of these, Trevor Edwards, the force was used against SWAPO and unarmed Angolan civilians. Edwards's story has been confirmed by a number of Angolans who were kidnapped by South Africa. Jose Ricardo Belmundo, an Angolan who was studying in Zaire, was taken from Zaire with other young men to join the South African troops in the invasion of Angola in 1975. After further military training by the South Africans he was drafted into "32 Batallion" and took part in operations in Angola against SWAPO refugees, FAPLA units and Angolan civilians. Belmundo deserted from "32 Batallion" and handed himself over to FAPLA. At a press conference in February 1981 he confirmed that there were French and English mercenaries in "32 Batallion", many of whom had seen service in Zimbabwe and Vietnam.

It appears that side by side with the kidnapping of Angolan men for "32 Batallion", a parallel campaign is going on using young women. A number of women gave evidence to an international commission of inquiry in February 1981. They said they had been captured by the South Africans and fitted with special vaginal devices; they had been sent into SWAPO camps to poison the men with whom they had sexual intercourse.

South Africa's war against Angola has been an unremitting campaign of bombing, kidnap and murder. The latest revelations show that South Africa's sophisticated arsenal includes napalm, supplied by France and the USA, which has been used in southern Angola. Clearly the South African attacks in Angola are not against SWAPO or the Cuban troops, as is often claimed, but against the whole Angolan people, whose lives and livelihood are under constant threat.

### Zimbabwe

Direct intervention in Zimbabwe by South African armed forces dates from as far back as 1967. At the time Prime Minister Vorster stated that South Africa would oppose the liberation struggle "wherever we are allowed to", and accordingly sent an estimated 1,700 South African troops to assist the illegal UDI regime. The numbers increased rapidly, reaching a figure in the mid-seventies of between three and four thousand. Despite Pretoria's insistence that this was merely a "token force", the South African contingent doubled the size of the Rhodesian military capacity, as the Rhodesian forces proper then amounted only to some 4,500 men.

In 1975 a number of South African paramilitary units were withdrawn from Rhodesia amidst considerable publicity, and so it became more difficult to measure the extent of South African intervention. However there is evidence of continuing South African assistance for the beleaguered Ian Smith. In 1977, for example, it was reported that South African jets had taken part in the Cimoi bombing raids in which hundreds of refugees were killed.<sup>4</sup> The South African military presence continued to increase, reaching a peak at the time of the internal settlement



elections of April 1979. The Anti-Apartheid Movement's publication *Fire Force Exposed* explained:

"The South Africans are integrated into the various divisions of the Rhodesian army and airforce so that they are less conspicuous, and it is believed that various arrangements have been worked out to allow South African regulars to complete part of their training in Rhodesia or to spend periods of secondment there. Other South Africans go to Rhodesia as civilian volunteers or, in other words, as mercenaries."<sup>5</sup>

In June 1979, Robert Mugabe, the President of ZANU-PF and eventual Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, stated that almost 5,000 South African troops were actively deployed on Rhodesian soil. Ultimately South African military intervention became a major issue at the Lancaster House Conference that terminated the war, and during the ceasefire period before the independence elections. Lord Soames, the last British Governor of Rhodesia, having initially tended to ignore the evidence of South African military activity in the pre-election period, was forced to order the removal of the South African forces.

### Zambia

Since 1976 Zambia too has been a target for South African military attack. Many of these bombardments have taken place in a Sesheke area, which borders on the South African strategic stronghold in the Caprivi strip, and the military camp at Katima Mulilo. Between 1977 and 1979 the South Africans took what they termed "appropriate action" against Zambia for attacks on Katima Mulilo. This included the bombing of the Sesheke school and the killing of Zambian civilians as well as attacks on SWAPO targets. President Kaunda told a press conference in October 1979 that the previous month a thousand South African troops had invaded Zambia to destroy her economy, escalate the war, and force Zambia to put pressure on the Patriotic Front to wreck the talks at Lancaster House. Kaunda's response was to restate his commitment to the Patriotic Front, and to appeal to the people of Zambia for vigilance in the face of the attacks.

The political settlement for the future of Zimbabwe reached at Lancaster House in February 1980 did not end the attack on Zambia. Early in 1980 South Africa again bombed Sesheke, the Kalongola pontoon on the Zambesi, and other targets within Zambia. Zambia lodged a complaint at the United Nations in April 1980 that its territory was being violated by hundreds of South African troops and daily overflights by South African warplanes. In response the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution strongly condemning South Africa for continued, intensified and unprovoked acts against Zambia, and demanded that South Africa immediately withdraw all her forces from Zambia and cease violations of Zambian airspace. South Africa had claimed in a letter to the Council that it was merely taking "protective action" against "SWAPO terrorists", but the Security Council warned that in the event of further armed incursions it would meet to consider further appropriate actions, including sanctions.

### Mozambique

On January 30 1981 a South African unit crossed the border into Mozambique, travelled miles into the country, and carried out a raid on Matola, a suburb of Maputo, where a number of members of the ANC(SA) lived. Twelve ANC members were killed. The South Africans claimed they had attacked an armed ANC position. Mr Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, rejoined: "There have never been any ANC bases or camps in Mozambique. There are residences and if the qualifications to make a house a base is only that the people in it can use a gun, then let us be told now." The Deputy Defence Minister of Mozambique said that he saw the raid as a challenge to Mozambique's right to shelter South Africans persecuted by the apartheid regime. Two months after this attack a second South African incursion into Mozambique was reported. A six-hour gun battle had taken place between Frelimo and SADF troops on a beach near the South African border. Like her incursions into Angola and Zambia, such incidents make South Africa's undeclared war against her neighbours evident.

### Covert intervention

Alongside these military attacks South Africa has also used many forms of covert action in attempts to undermine governments which oppose her. Chief amongst these has been training and arming disaffected groups within the countries under attack.

### Angola

In Angola, South Africa has trained and armed the UNITA forces of Jonas Savimbi. After the overthrow of the Caetano regime in Lisbon in April 1974, UNITA was the first of the opposition forces in Angola to sign a ceasefire with the Portuguese. Savimbi claimed at the time that Angola was not ready for independence. Despite being a member of the transitional government formed to arrange elections, UNITA declared war on MPLA early in 1975. UNITA was the perfect vehicle for South Africa in her drive to prevent MPLA taking power after independence. As described above, South Africa used UNITA in her 1975 invasion of Angola and attempted to assist UNITA in establishing its position in the southern provinces.

Although, the South African land forces withdrew from Angola in March 1976 after their defeat by MPLA, UNITA troops remained. They sabotaged a number of MPLA positions, especially on the strategic Benguela railway line. Between 1974 and 1976 Savimbi enjoyed support amongst the Ovimbundu people, where MPLA strength was underdeveloped. He was successfully able to appeal to fears of invasion from the north, and when the South Africans retreated Savimbi, through rumour and coercion, was able to take large numbers of Ovimbundu with UNITA into the bush. However, even with South African supplies UNITA was unable to feed the people. From 1979 many of them began moving back to the towns,



*Jose Belmundo of South Africa's "Buffalo Battalion", composed of mercenaries, situated in Northern Namibia for actions inside Angola.*

abandoning Savimbi. Some went because of starvation, others were alienated by UNITA's attacks on their cattle and homesteads.

Despite its growing unpopularity UNITA, armed and backed by South Africa, continues to pose a military threat to MPLA. The Reagan administration in Washington is making moves to repeal the Clark amendment and provide aid for UNITA, despite strong protests from the governments of the frontline states and Black political leaders inside South Africa. The popularity of MPLA is a certain guarantee against the inroads of UNITA, but so long as the movement has powerful outside support it can attempt to destabilise the Angolan government.

### **Zimbabwe**

The victory of the liberation struggle has not brought an end to the threat of South African military aggression against independent Zimbabwe. Within months of Zimbabwe's independence celebrations, Prime Minister Mugabe protested that the South Africans had recruited an army of dissidents, some 5,000 strong, and were providing training facilities in the Northern Transvaal, just south of the Zimbabwe border. "The intention seems clear to me", Mugabe said, "that these people are there to be used for sabotage work and other subversive activities."<sup>6</sup> To date no major incidents of this kind have occurred, but Pretoria cannot view with equanimity the loss of her neighbouring buffer state.

### **Zambia**

Covert intervention through the use of disaffected groups has taken place in Zambia, although the scale of South Africa's use of the tactic there is not yet fully known. In 1976, four men were put on trial in Zambia accused of recruiting Zambians for military training in Namibia as part of a plot financed by South Africa to bring about the overthrow of President Kaunda. The sentences against these men were quashed in 1978, yet it seems that this was one of a number of attempts by the South Africans to back opponents of Kaunda. Adamson Mushala, the leader of an armed group who opposed Kaunda, was flown with a number of followers from Zambia to Namibia in November 1974. Although South Africa has denied knowledge of Mushala's political inclinations, and claimed he was merely a refugee, it later appeared in evidence presented before a Zambian court that Mushala and his followers had been given military training in Namibia. On their return to Zambia they engaged in small forays against government troops, capturing arms and poaching cattle. Like UNITA in Angola, they operated in an area of Zambia where there is a history of disaffection from the government, in this case the north-west province. Government troops killed eighteen members of the gang in September 1979, and in April 1981 two more were killed by police. Mushala himself has evaded capture and is said to derive his support from villagers who claim the government is ignoring the rural areas.<sup>7</sup>



### Mozambique

In Mozambique too South Africa is backing dissident groups involved in sabotage campaigns. President Samora Machel has agreed with Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe on a joint defence programme to crush the rebel forces. The two countries are concerned that continuing sabotage of crucial communication networks will seriously weaken the attempts at post-war recovery. For example, guerrilla attacks delay traffic on the railway line from Umtali in Zimbabwe to the Mozambican port of Beira.

The Mozambican dissidents are represented by the anti-Frelimo group, the MRN, a small group of guerrillas financed by diehard Portuguese colonialists who cannot accept the reality of independent Mozambique. After the collapse of Portuguese rule, the MRN mounted a sporadic sabotage campaign inside Mozambique. It enjoyed practical assistance from the Smith-Muzorewa Government and help from Malawi's maverick dictator, Dr. Hasting Banda. Jorge Jardim, an ultra-right wing businessman and close friend of Banda, is believed to be the chief financier of the MRN. In February 1981 the Mozambican authorities captured a group of dissidents close to the Malawi border in the Mulanji district.

During the Smith regime in Zimbabwe, the MRN was provided with a base at Umtali near the Mozambique border with broadcasting facilities for its radio, the so-called 'Voice of Free Africa'. Following the Lancaster House settlement the entire operation moved into South Africa, although both Pretoria and the MRN officially deny that it operates from the Republic's territory.

Despite such denials there is clear evidence of South Africa's involvement. During fighting in August 1980 between Frelimo and MRN forces, the Mozambicans overran a supply dump for the dissidents and found quantities of South African ammunition marked in both English and Afrikaans. Recent prisoners taken by Frelimo have also made statements about South African assistance. Apparently the South Africans have a military base at Guzanculo, close to the Mozambican border and from here the dissidents are supplied with arms and shelter.

In the wake of the military agreement between Mozambique and Zimbabwe the South Africans appear prepared to support dissidents from both countries. A Portuguese spokesman for MRN has warned that "it will strike back with full force in Zimbabwe" in retaliation for the agreed alliance. The most recent MRN attack took place at Espungabera near the Mozambique — Zimbabwe border. 140 refugees fled into Zimbabwe as a result.

### Terror tactics.

While the use of disaffected groups seems the main thrust of South African covert intervention, use has also been made of various terror tactics such as parcel bombs, assassinations and kidnappings of members of the southern African opposition movements exiled in neighbouring territories. Such activity has a long history. Among the more recent examples are the kidnapping in Swaziland in June 1976 of

22 members of the ANC (SA) by South African policemen, the murder in Zambia of the South African refugee Patrick Pilane, and in Botswana of the exiles Welile Faku and Simon Makgofe. In July 1979 a bomb in a parcel to the ANC publication Sechaba injured five people in Lesotho. In 1975 a parcel bomb of a similar kind killed the Black Consciousness Movement leader Abraham Tiro, who had recently gone into exile in Botswana. In February 1981 the home of a Lesotho lawyer who had represented members of the ANC was fired on, and the Lesotho Minister of Information claimed that a raid against Lesotho, similar to the Matola raid against the ANC in Mozambique, had been foiled.<sup>8</sup>

The strategy behind these attacks seems to be to destabilise and psychologically undermine opposition groups working from the bordering countries. In the case of Tiro, the assassination seems to have been calculated to rob the BCM of a leader before he had time to establish either himself or his following outside the country. The attacks on the ANC seem a combination of terror, raids for intelligence, and kidnapping for interrogation.

### Spying

South Africa is engaged not only in attacks on her neighbours, but also in assembling intelligence on these countries and the activities of the southern African liberation movements there. Her intelligence interests may be divided into three broad categories:

- a) military intelligence
- b) political intelligence
- c) commercial and industrial intelligence.

Political intelligence was until 1980 supplied by the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) assisted by the military. Some of the operations of BOSS in southern Africa were revealed by Arthur McGiven in articles published in *Observer* in 1980. It is still doubtful how accurate the information McGiven supplied is, but some of the claims he made were that three divisions of BOSS were directly concerned with the affairs of neighbouring African states; Division G was responsible for military evaluations in liaison with the defence force. McGiven also claimed that a covert Operation Division controlled agents in African states. These were generally South African nationals or foreigners who travelled regularly in Africa on business; they were responsible for recruiting agents in foreign airports and other strategic sites. Whatever the truth of these statements, the situation has probably somewhat altered since BOSS was replaced by a new department DONS (the Department of National Security).

A number of South African and British businessmen have been expelled from countries in southern Africa, charged with spying for South Africa. In February 1978 a British electrician, John Samson, was deported from Botswana to South Africa. He had in his possession uniforms of the SADF and the Rhodesian army, and photographs of refugee camps and of the Botswana defence force in the Selepe



Pikwe area. Two South Africans, Theron Scheepers and Kenneth Momsen, were held in Lesotho in March 1978 on suspicion of espionage. They were eventually returned to South Africa after negotiations by the Lesotho Foreign Ministry.

#### Notes to Chapter Two

1. M. Stockwell, *In search of enemies*, Futura, London, 1979.
2. Briefing by Tenente—Coronel Ngongo, Head of Intelligence and Reconnaissance, FAPLA, to the International Commission of Inquiry, Luanda, 30 January — 3 February 1981.
3. Ibid.
4. *Guardian*, 19/4/78
5. Anti—Apartheid Movement, *Fire Force Exposed*, London, 1979, P.37.
6. *Herald*, June 1980
7. *Herald*, 14/4/81
8. *Rand Daily Mail*, 17/2/81

## Chapter Three

### Economic Influence and Control

“The aim of (South Africa’s ‘outward policy’) is largely through economic incentives to induce African countries to enter into some degree of cooperation with South Africa, thus breaking South Africa’s isolation and eventually reducing liberation pressures.” (Henry Kissinger, National Security Study Memorandum 39, 1969.)

The dependence of the states of southern Africa on the economic power of South Africa is a dominating feature of the political and economic position of many of the peoples of the region, though it is important to distinguish between the almost total stranglehold exercised by South Africa over the “hostage states” of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, and at the opposite end of the spectrum, the very attenuated links that South Africa has with Angola. In a study commissioned by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (described in detail in Chapter 5) the situation was explained in the following terms:

“The countries are different in their degree and type of dependence on South Africa. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland all have the same type of problem in this respect. In the short term, the economic dependence manifests itself in the form of overwhelming economic dependency and potential political leverage by South Africa over them. In the longer term, the political dominance of South Africa will no doubt change and become more manageable, but the problem of economic dependence for these countries, reflecting their location on the periphery of South Africa is more intractable.

“Somewhat more loosely connected to the centre of gravitation represented by the Republic of South Africa are Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Their economies are in some important respects linked to that centre but hardly to the extent of making them economic appendages, as is now largely a characteristic — in varying degrees — of Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. Geographically, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe form a group situated between the centres of the East African region and of South Africa. Somewhat peripherally in the region in this respect, and therefore having the weakest dependence on South Africa are Angola and Tanzania.”<sup>1</sup>

Under the “total strategy” that South Africa has adopted to meet the growing challenge posed by the liberation struggle, every type of economic influence that she has over the region is called into play. South African politicians are increasingly

suggesting that the grain sales to the region should be used as a political weapon, and in March 1981 the Prime Minister, P. W. Botha, threatened to cut off food sales to South Africa's neighbours if they voted for sanctions against the regime in the United Nations.<sup>2</sup> As South Africa's Agricultural Minister put it so pungently: "When you get down to basics, full bellies are more important than full ammunition pouches."<sup>3</sup> The withdrawal of grain supplies is no mean threat: in 1980, Zambia imported 250,000 tons of South African maize; Mozambique 150,000 tons of maize and 50,000 tons of wheat; and Zimbabwe 100,000 tons of maize.<sup>4</sup>

### Trade

The trade patterns of southern Africa arise from the colonial heritage, which made South Africa the primary conduit for trade between Europe and the subcontinent. Since independence the states of southern Africa have begun to consider the implications of this heritage, yet changes have been small scale and hard to achieve, and politicians have tried to work within the existing patterns of trade, rather than embark upon the search for uncharted alternatives. South Africa has most to lose in political as well as economic terms from any radical restructuring of trade; the development of a flourishing trade with the rest of Africa has been described as the touchstone of South Africa's foreign policy.<sup>5</sup>

The extent of South African trade with the region can be appreciated from the table on page 27. The dependence of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland is evident from the fact that in 1976 58.6% of their trade was with South Africa. The position of Lesotho, with 94% of her trade being with South Africa, is particularly serious. Zimbabwe too is heavily reliant on South African imports, although the pattern may have altered since independence and the lifting of sanctions. However, Angola and Tanzania are both independent of South African trade. Malawi too could diversify her sources of imports, if she so desired, while her exports to South Africa are not sufficient to constitute a serious threat to her independence; her trade with South Africa is a matter of political choice, rather than geographic necessity.

It is important to consider not only the total trade of each country with South Africa, but to break this down into its components and assess the importance of that trade to the country concerned, and the alternative markets available. A detailed analysis of this subject is beyond the scope of this paper, but most of South Africa's exports to the region consist of manufactured goods and machinery. The machine exports are of particular importance to South African manufacturers, since they allow them to achieve economies of scale that they would otherwise not obtain. The machinery could, in general, be imported by independent states of the subcontinent from other sources, such as Europe, the USA or Japan, but South Africa has an advantage over her competitors because she has shorter distances to her customers, and hence shorter delivery times.

It is disturbing that in southern Africa there appears to be a trend towards increasing dependence on trade with South Africa. This is indicated by the statistics in table 1; in 1979 South African exports to Africa increased by 39% over the

previous year.<sup>6</sup> The trading relationships between the countries of the region and South Africa are extremely dangerous, since the regime is set on using these links for its political ends.

TABLE 1

Exports to South Africa 1976, 1978 in US \$ million.

Country	Exports	Total	1 as % 2.	Exports	Total	1 as % 2
Angola	—	530.1	—	21.4	1061.6	2.0%
Botswana	26.7	176.2	15.2%	—	—	—
Lesotho	15.2	16.9	89.9%	—	—	—
Swaziland	38.7	193.7	20.0%	—	—	—
Zimbabwe	110.0	685.0	16.1%	—	—	—
Zambia	0.6	812.3	0.1%	2.4	779.1	0.3%
Malawi	8.3	168.4	4.9%	12.5	188.9	6.6%
Mozambique	11.5	149.8	7.7%	7.3	284.3	2.6%
Tanzania	—	429.1	—	—	544.6	—

Imports from South Africa 1976, 1978, in US \$ million.

Country	Imports from SA	Total	1 as % 2	Imports from SA	Total	1 as % 2
Angola	—	286.0	—	108.9	780.4	14.0%
Botswana	152.7	187.7	81.4%	—	—	—
Lesotho	167.3	177.3	94.4%	—	—	—
Swaziland	118.3	135.3	87.4%	—	—	—
Zimbabwe	174.9	414.3	42.2%	—	—	—
Zambia	12.2	671.9	1.8%	53.6	639.6	8.4%
Malawi	54.6	161.8	33.8%	123.9	328.2	37.8%
Mozambique	40.5	269.1	15.1%	55.3	596.8	9.3%
Tanzania	—	644.0	—	—	1203.7	—

Sources: *International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Annuals*, 1970-76; 1972-78 and SDCC, *Economic Dependence and Regional Cooperation* Table 8.

### Migrant Labour.

That labour from surrounding underdeveloped countries pours into a more advanced economy is not a phenomenon unique to South Africa. Migrant labour in



South Africa was specifically created and maintained by successive South African governments to provide a seemingly inexhaustible supply of cheap labour for her mines. From as far afield as Tanzania and Zaire migrant labour has come to South Africa in search of employment since the opening up of the diamond and gold fields in the 1870's and 1880's. Gold was plentiful but difficult to mine, and the mineowners from the beginning found themselves short of labour. In order to avoid bidding against each other for labour, thereby driving up wages, they formed a buyers' monopoly. And to increase the supply of labour they set up a system of recruiting agents throughout southern and central Africa.

In some areas of South Africa they had the added advantage of an amenable administration which took steps to "encourage" Africans to offer themselves for what was dangerous, difficult and poorly paid work. A number of measures were imposed that reduced the land holding of Africans, thereby tending to turn a once flourishing peasantry into an impoverished pool of labour. At the same time taxes were levied which had to be paid in cash. The result was the stream of cheap labour required by the mine owners.<sup>7</sup>

While men were required in the mines, women and children were certainly not. The families of African miners had to remain at their place of origin, while their men undertook fixed term contracts in the mines.

Initially, the mineowners were able to rely on the miners' families subsisting on their own production, thereby allowing wages to be reduced below the subsistence level. As the rural reserves in South Africa, Lesotho and parts of Botswana and Swaziland deteriorated under population pressure and neglect, this meagre living upon which families existed, disappeared. Instead, miners were drawn from increasingly impoverished, dependent and desperate communities. The human misery inflicted by the prolonged migrant labour system has been so appalling that even the pro-apartheid Dutch Reform Church has been moved to describe it as a "cancer" in South African society.

Some of the economies of the states surrounding South Africa have also become dependent upon the demand for migrant labour. The earning of migrants play a significant part in the Gross National Products of these states, providing much-needed foreign exchange. At the same time the demand for labour provides work for many who have no alternative source of employment.

The following table indicates the number of foreign migrant workers employed in the South African gold mines in 1979.

Country	Number
Lesotho	94,028
Botswana	17,645
Swaziland	7,645
Mozambique	38,995
Other	24,551

Sources: *Optima*, Vol. 28 No.2/3, Table 2.

The previous year Lesotho had had a total of 155,623 migrant workers employed throughout the South African economy. This was a fall of some 50,000 from the previous year—although the statistics are notoriously inaccurate, as they fail to take account of the large number of unregistered migrant workers in South Africa. In 1977/8 some 200,000 Sotho migrants worked in South Africa, representing a third of the country's work force. Their earnings represented 41% of the total Gross National Product of that impoverished country. Even these figures probably underestimate the number of migrants in South Africa because of the substantial number of illegal migrants who escape the register.<sup>8</sup>

Over the past few years several countries have attempted to reduce the number of migrants working in South Africa. Mozambique has made particularly strenuous efforts to find alternative employment and income in agriculture and industry. President Banda of Malawi summarily ended the flow of labour to South Africa in 1974 after a plane crash in which many Malawian labourers died, but after a period of 18 months the supply of labour was resumed. During the interruption there was an increased flow of Malawian labour to Zambia and Tanzania, but there was also a sharp drop in consumption levels in the rural areas of Malawi.<sup>9</sup>

The search for alternatives is now being forced upon the states of the region, for South Africa has begun to reduce its demand for foreign migrant labour. In part this is a reponse to growing domestic unemployment in South Africa, particularly in the traditional labour reserves of the Transkei and the Ciskei, and in part to the introduction of capital-intensive machinery in the mines. It also reflects a fear that labour from independent Africa may "contaminate" the local labour force with ideas considered unsuitable by the apartheid state. But it will be many years before the socially destructive migrants labour system is eradicated.

#### The Power of South African capital.

South African companies have played a significant part in developing the Republic's regional influence. To indicate that a South African-based company has a subsidiary in, say, Zambia, is not proof that these companies are a vehicle for the policies of the South African government. It can be argued that like any company they are only interested in profits, and are therefore "non-political". Because the operations of private companies are secret it would be impossible to prove that any company's operations were politically motivated, but it is significant that during the last ten years there has been a growing bond between private capital and the state in South Africa.

In 1972 the South African State Security Council was established to advise the government on the formation of national policy and strategy, and to determine intelligence priorities. Since then, a web of committees has sprung up, forming an alternative structure of government, and by-passing Parliament. The Defence Advisory Council, established in 1973, brings together the heads of private industry and members of the Defence Force to advise the Minister of Defence.

This transformation of the machinery of South African government into a military—industrial system to uphold national security has grave implications for the states of the subcontinent. At the very least, the extensive interests of South African industry throughout the region means that the heads of industry who sit on these committees have at their disposal detailed information concerning the economic life of independent states. This in turn means that the South African government now has a *de facto* intelligence network throughout southern Africa, provided by the companies that are now tied into the structures of the state.

The exact extent of the interests of South African private capital in the region is not known. Some idea of their influence can be grasped from a brief examination of the largest South African-based company of all — the Anglo-American Corporation's Annual Report for 1980 states that: "The value of the companies that the Corporation administers and of the direct interests that it and its administered finance companies held at March 31 1980 was R11,000 million." The financial resources of the Corporation are many times those of the majority of the states of the region. With resources of this magnitude negotiations between the Corporation and the independent countries in which it operates cannot be a bargain struck between equals.

A major study of the subject indicated the geographical extent of the Corporation's holdings: "Either directly, or through its core companies and their subsidiaries, the group has interests in Angola, Botswana, Tanzania, Kenya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Zaire, and Zambia."<sup>10</sup>

In southern Africa outside the Republic, the Corporation's interests include major stakes in the diamonds of Angola and Botswana; the Zambian copper mines; coal mines, agricultural estates and industrial interests in Zimbabwe, and iron and coal mines in Swaziland. Often these interests are held in conjunction with the state or local capital. With such widely diversified holdings the Corporation is in a position to play a decisive part in the economies of the region. The remarks of the Corporation's Chairman, Harry Oppenheimer, concerning the "constellation of state" concept should be seen in this context.

### Finance

As the most developed country in the subcontinent, South Africa has the most complex and the best articulated financial infrastructure. South Africa has a powerful indigeneous banking, insurance and finance sector, and also plays host to the major international financial institutions. A number of international banks use the Republic as a regional headquarters for their operations throughout southern Africa. The implications of this are difficult to assess, as they have been the subject of little published research, but it would be interesting to know the degree to which investment decisions by international companies affecting independent states in the region are taken in Johannesburg.

Three southern African states — Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are

financially dependent on South Africa. All three are members of the South African Customs Union, and Lesotho and Swaziland belong to the Rand Monetary Area (RMA). The RMA fixes the international value of the currencies of Lesotho and Swaziland by linking them to the South African rand, making them entirely dependent on South Africa in financial matters. Neither Lesotho nor Swaziland can regulate her monetary policies in line with an independent development strategy. The monetary system reinforces the magnetic attractions of the developed economy of South Africa, which draws in foreign exchange and surplus funds from these neighbouring states.<sup>11</sup>

The role of the Customs Union is more complex imposing a uniform set of tariffs on all goods entering the four countries. Prior to 1976, when the agreement was renegotiated, the Customs Union was designed so that Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland's share in the revenue was dependent upon fluctuations in the South African economy. Subsequently a new formula was agreed to iron out some of the fluctuations, and allow for longer-term planning. However, the changes do not allow Botswana, Lesotho or Swaziland to exercise any independent control over the customs, sales and excise duties they charge.

This gives rise to a number of problems. Firstly, these three countries cannot use tariff barriers to protect their infant industries from South African imports, because the agreement provides for a free flow of goods between members of the Customs Union. Secondly, they cannot impose tariffs against other countries since, as members of the Customs Union, they are bound to accept the average duty of only 5% imposed on imports by South Africa. Thus Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are unable to adopt the protective duties generally used by developing countries to protect their industries in their initial stages of growth.<sup>12</sup>

Such quantitative restrictions as exist within the Customs Union, including import quotas, are designed to benefit South African industry, and the result of these restrictions within Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland is merely to raise the price of the goods affected. Finally, South Africa's indirect taxes — excise and sales tax — are, like the rest of her policies, designed to favour the rich (and white) at expense of the majority. Essential consumer goods are often taxed at the same rate as luxury goods, instead of loading the tax burden on those items that can be dispensed with. As one researcher put it: "... the southern African indirect—tax structure is regressive, and the relative price structure in southern Africa favours the consumption patterns of high income groups (in South Africa, largely white and voters), relative to low-income consumption patterns, much more than in most other parts of Africa. This implies that any distribution of money income in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland corresponds to a less egalitarian distribution of real income than it would elsewhere in Africa".<sup>13</sup>

Together, these controls mean that the three countries are effectively the monetary and fiscal captives of South Africa. Independent financial policies of these countries are severely limited, if not altogether impossible, because of their agreements with South Africa.



The Republic has not been slow to realise the potential for expanding its financial control beyond Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. It is perhaps indicative of South African thinking that it is the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of South Africa, Gerhard de Kock, who has been appointed "Co-ordinator of Constellation Affairs". In July 1980 he was appointed chairman of a high level "Constellation Committee" to consider a comprehensive plan for the region.<sup>14</sup>

A central aspect of any such plan will be a southern African Development Bank. According to one journal, this is to be "... at the core of Prime Minister Botha's grand design for regional economic co-operation within a constellation of states".<sup>15</sup> Such a bank would be modelled on the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank, and has been described in the following terms:

"Member governments will contribute share capital to its formation, while further funds will be raised, if possible on the capital markets, both here and abroad. ... Membership on a government basis suggests that the bank will not attempt to cut across existing political structures, so the geo-political foundations of apartheid appears to be safe for the moment. ... A large part of its operations will be concerned with 'unifying and co-ordinating the notion of regional development across political borders'.<sup>16</sup>


As the exact composition and function of such a bank is a matter of speculation, its impact is difficult to assess. There is however, little doubt that no matter how it is finally constituted, it will go a long way towards the goal spelled out by South Africa's foreign Minister, Pik Botha:

"...Regional co-operation in southern Africa will have to involve all countries in the region, despite the unfavourable conditions prevailing today. ... This type of technical and economic co-operation will lay the foundation for improved political relations which will be to the advantage of the southern African community of nations as a whole."<sup>17</sup>

The independent states of the region seem to view the prospect with less enthusiasm. Their analysis of the prospects of such a union have been at least in part responsible for the setting-up of the alternative institutions described in the final chapter of this study.

#### **Transport and Communications.**

The transport and communications system of southern Africa arose out of the need for the rapid transfer of mineral and agricultural commodities to the developed capitalist world. A secondary purpose, which later became increasingly important, was to provide the area with the manufactured products of the metropolitan countries. As the region's development can, to a large extent be traced to the opening up of the South African hinterland in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the rail and road links of the region were constructed to extend the existing South African facilities northwards. The first roads and railways connected the Witwatersrand to the sea, linking the area with the ports of Durban, Cape Town and Lourenco Marques (now Maputo). Only later were facilities built



*Bridge destroyed by South African forces in southern Angola, 1979.*

to connect the rest of the subcontinent to the sea by links with the South African communications system. The major exceptions to this basic proposition are to be found in the former Portuguese empire, where railways were built to connect the Zambian and Zairean copperbelt to ports in the Portuguese colonies. To the west, the line runs to Lobito in Angola; to the east it goes via Zimbabwe and Malawi to the Mozambiquan ports of Nacala, Beira and Maputo.

South Africa not only provides the hub of the regions rail network. The countries bordering on South Africa routed their international telephone calls and telexes through South Africa, making all such communications vulnerable to the regime's sophisticated intelligence-gathering operation. Some progress has now been made to find independent means of communication. Botswana, for example, in 1980 linked its calls to the rest of the world by means of a satellite.

Air traffic suffers from the same difficulty. For many years the only link between the South Africa's neighbours was via Johannesburg. Recently the airlines of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have established direct connections with their neighbours, bypassing Johannesburg. This has not prevented the South Africans from intercepting the flights; as the African National Congress found to its cost, the South African authorities are not beyond forcing down an aircraft in flight over South Africa in order to abduct a member of the liberation movement.

It is the railways — vital in terms of the region's main trade in primary commodities — that provide the clearest evidence of South Africa's importance. Between 1975 and November 1978 the attacks on the Benguela railway cut the line between the copper belt and Lobito. The attacks were carried out by UNITA, the insurgent group in Angola financed, trained and equipped by South Africa. The effects of this action rippled across the entire region. With the closure of the Mozambique-Rhodesian border in 1976, and the Rhodesian regimes attacks on the Mozambique rail system in 1978 (again with South Africa's backing) the copper producers of Zambia and Zaire had only two options: the Tazara railway, linking Zambia with the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salam, and the South African ports.

The international copper companies in Zaire immediately switched 35-40% of their copper exports through Zambia and Rhodesia to South African ports. In January 1977 it was revealed that 125,000 tonnes of copper was to be exported from Zaire to Japan via South African port of East London. By 1979 it was estimated that Zambia and Zaire were sending 46% of their minerals to East London via Rhodesia.<sup>18</sup>

The Tazara railway, from Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar-es-Salaam, was built with Chinese finance and expertise after the West's refusal to support this attempt to loosen the dependency of southern Africa upon the traditional communications system. The line came into operation in 1976, but was unable to cope with the added cargo from the copper mines. The line has been plagued by poor maintenance, slow turn-around times, and congestion at Dar-es-Salaam. Consequently, in October 1978, faced with increasing economic difficulties, the

demands of business interests and pressure from the International Monetary Fund, Zambia re-opened her border with Rhodesia, and the trade of the copper belt was once again channelled through Rhodesia. This represented a major victory for South Africa: by supporting the Smith regime and UNITA, South Africa had forced Zaire and Zambia, much against their will, to break United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, and valuable transit traffic was once more passing through South African ports.

The increased volume of rail traffic brought South Africa considerable advantages, but also caused certain difficulties. The additional freight stretched the handling capacity of her railways and harbours to the utmost, particularly during the seasonal peaks arising from her agricultural exports. This, together with the cost advantages available to her from the shorter Witwatersrand-Maputo route, led South Africa to adopt a "marriage of convenience" with Mozambique. South African goods passing through Maputo soon passed the pre-independence levels. A two-year agreement was signed between the two countries to modernise and improve the rail link between Maputo and the South African border and to treble the carrying capacity of the line<sup>19</sup>.

Indeed, so close has the collaboration been between the two countries appeared that it was necessary for the Mozambiquan Minister of Ports and Land Transport to rebut rumours that South African personnel flew into Maputo daily to man vital installations.<sup>20</sup>

Such close relations with the Republic are always a two-edged sword. Until recently the South African Railways had leased 25 diesel locomotives to move Zimbabwe's grain harvest, which had reached record proportions. At the same time, Zimbabwe continued to antagonise the Republic by speaking out against apartheid in international fora, such as the United Nations. In April 1981 the South Africans decided to end the leases and pull back the locomotives to South Africa by 1 June, and Zimbabwe was placed in the unenviable position of having to appeal for international assistance to overcome its plight.<sup>21</sup>

The key economic and political importance of transport is clear to the independent states of southern Africa. For that reason it has been chosen as the first priority of these countries seeking to reduce their dependence upon South Africa, a subject that is considered in the final chapter.

#### Notes to Chapter Three

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- 2 *The Times*, 11 March 1981.
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## Chapter Four

### Malawi — South Africa's Black Ally.

South Africa's strategic designs are nowhere more obvious than in Malawi. Although situated in the midst of those states directly opposing South Africa — the "frontline states" — Malawi is in no sense part of that opposition. Indeed, the degree of South African influence is so great that Malawi may serve as a model of Pretoria's plans for the entire subcontinent.

The following passage, taken from an article in the South African *Rand Daily Mail*, provides a glimpse of this penetration of Malawi.

"The curio-laden tourist was sorry to be leaving 'Man, Malawi is just like a sixth province', he said in an unmistakably South-of-the Limpopo accent....The shops are stocked with South African food, drink and clothing. many people speak the familiar African patois learned on South Africa's mines and in suburban kitchens....Comfortingly in contemporary Africa, South Africans know they have an embassy in Lilongwe, the new capital they helped Malawi to build with an R8 million loan..."<sup>1</sup>

Yet Malawi has no common border with South Africa. She is the only independent African state to enjoy diplomatic, trading and, perhaps, military links with South Africa. Furthermore, Malawi is dependent to a considerable extent on the wealth of the apartheid regime. How has this independent nation fallen so completely under the influence of the Republic of South Africa?

The answer lies in the historical circumstances of Malawi's independence. On 6 July 1964 the former British colony of Nyasaland became the new state of Malawi. Independence was the culmination of a successful mass mobilisation of the people behind the nationalist movement, the Malawi Congress Party, and its leader, Dr Hastings Kwamusu Banda. In a broad mass movement like the Malawi Congress Party, a political organisation with no ideological foundation save opposition to colonial rule, there is inevitably a high risk of internal dispute. Such a conflict occurred just three months after Malawi's independence, when a major disagreement in the Cabinet resulted in the forced exile of a number of the more radical nationalist leaders. Malawi began to move down the road to dictatorship, a process completed when Banda appointed himself "President for Life" in 1971.

As a result of the conflict in the Malawi Congress Party, Banda felt threatened by the danger of armed insurrection from the exiled dissidents, and urgently required a guarantee of military security. At the same time, he decided to



consolidate his power base by moving the capital to Lilongwe, in the central region of the country where he enjoyed most of his ethnic support. South Africa eagerly offered to meet his needs, and Banda's relationship with Pretoria began in earnest.

By 1966, Malawi enjoyed full diplomatic and trade links with South Africa, and had received a handsome loan for the Lilongwe project. Banda openly flaunted his military reliance on the apartheid regime. At the time of an unsuccessful coup attempt in October 1967, he warned, "Already I am receiving messages from some of our friends... They are offering us any help, to crush the gangsters... I wanted you my people to know that... we are not without friends."<sup>2</sup> There was never any doubt which "friends" Banda had in mind.

### Pretoria's Strategic Pawn

Malawi's pro-South African stance provided Pretoria with a valuable ally in the crisis-torn region of southern Africa. While the two "buffer states" of Rhodesia and Mozambique were experiencing the flourishing militancy of African nationalism, Malawi openly collaborated with the white minorities. The *Daily Telegraph* noted that Banda had placed "...major obstacles in the path of pan-Africanist forces bent on the destruction of white rule in South Africa. In the growing racial confrontation Malawi could not be more strategically placed."<sup>3</sup>

Such logic was not lost on the South African Government, which was quick to encourage Banda's maverick stand against the intensifying liberation struggle.

Malawi's strategic position was particularly crucial in Mozambique during the bitter armed struggle of the liberation movement FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique). Malawi probes into the middle of Mozambique like a long finger, and could have been an excellent sanctuary for Frelimo forces. But Banda refused to sanction any such use of Malawi's territory. Indeed, Frelimo accused Banda of permitting the Portuguese secret police to operate against them in Malawi.

Banda openly sympathised with the Portuguese. In 1969, for example, he claimed:

"The Portuguese in Mozambique have changed their policy towards their own Africans. You do not hear any more harsh treatment... Even their methods of administration are becoming more liberal... We Africans, North of Zambia, have no right to speak for all the Africans now under colonial rule. What do we know what the Africans of Mozambique themselves want?"<sup>4</sup>

Following the collapse of Portuguese rule, Samora Machel, soon to become President of Mozambique, denounced Malawi's attempt to undermine the liberation struggle. Contrasting the vital support provided to Frelimo by neighbouring Tanzania, Machel tersely commented "there were others with whom we also had common borders, which did not serve the struggle. Quite the contrary."<sup>5</sup>

Since the independence of Mozambique, Banda has maintained his hostility towards Frelimo. In conjunction with former Portuguese colonialists and the South

Africans, Malawi has assisted small bands of rebels in sabotage attacks inside Mozambique. The chief financier of this guerrilla force, Jorge Jardim, is a close confidant of Banda, and was Malawi's honorary consul in Mozambique before independence.

Malawi's role in the struggle for Zimbabwe has been equally reactionary. Both at the United Nations and within the Organisation of African Unity, Banda consistently abstained on resolutions calling upon Britain to use force against the illegal Rhodesian government. He described Britain's commitment to NIBMAR ('No Independence Before Majority Rule') as an "empty, idle and absolutely useless slogan".<sup>6</sup>

At the height of Zimbabwe's civil war, in 1977, Banda secretly arranged a meeting between South African foreign minister, Pik Botha, and the leaders of the internal settlement, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole. The latter in particular gained Banda's support; large numbers of Sithole's supporters were provided with military training inside Malawi.<sup>7</sup>

In contrast, President Banda's attitude to ZAPU and ZANU, the two wings of the Patriotic Front Alliance, was one of open contempt. Just as he had opposed the liberation movement in Mozambique, Banda actively hindered Zimbabwe's armed struggle. Even after the signing of the Lancaster House agreement in 1980, which agreed a constitution for Zimbabwe and laid out a timetable for elections, Banda broadcast a warning: "Be on guard against infiltration of Patriotic Front forces..." Essentially, the warning was an instruction to the Malawi secret police to continue to arrest and detain any forces of the Patriotic Front who came into their hands, as they had done in the past. In 1976, for example, Dr Nathan Shamuyarira (now the Zimbabwean Minister of Information) was arrested at Malawi's Chileka airport, while flying from Tanzania to Mozambique, he was released after two weeks in detention.

### Military Links?

The extraordinary degree of Malawi's collaboration with the racist regimes of southern Africa has frequently led observers to conclude that South Africa and Malawi have agreed on a basis for military co-operation. Despite denials by both governments, there is considerable evidence of South African military involvement in Malawi. In 1969, a South African military attache was posted to Malawi, and the following year an official "leak" substantiated already widespread rumours: the South African Minister of Health, Carel de Wet, described Malawi as "our most forward departure point in the North" against guerrilla activity, adding that it was "generally known" that military ties existed. Soon after, the Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda claimed that the South Africans were operating from a military base at Lilongwe. Banda's dismissal of the claim as "absolute nonsense" did little to ease the fears of the frontline states. Further suspicions were raised in 1971, when South Africa supplied four planeloads of military equipment to Malawi, including nine armoured scout cars.<sup>8</sup>



*Miners at Anglo-American corporation's Rhokawa copper mine in Zimbabwe.  
Photo: United Nations.*

It seems very likely that President Kaunda's suspicions are justified, and that Lilongwe does have a South African military base, operating in a surveillance capacity rather than in a directly offensive role. Possibly connected to such an arrangement are the reports of South African government personnel working in Malawi, an example being Mr Dawie van der Spuy, who for a number of years held the post of Director of Information in the Malawi civil service.

#### **Dialogue with Apartheid**

Malawi's strategic value to South Africa is not merely geographic. Equally important is her role in international diplomacy. Banda has not only been prepared to act as a practical obstacle to the liberation movements in southern Africa, but has also actively undermined Black Africa's attempt to isolate the Government of South Africa. Despite the growing aggression of white supremacism, Banda has championed the cause of "dialogue", and condemned both the armed struggle and the demand for sanctions.

Even assuming that Banda sincerely believes in the value of dialogue, the strategy of talking apartheid out of existence has failed miserably. The experience of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and the continuing struggle in Namibia and South Africa have illustrated the cruel inevitability of meeting force with force. Within the frontline states, there is today, no doubt about the necessity of the armed struggle. The history of Malawi's dialogue with South Africa reveals no credible commitment to removing the iniquities of apartheid. South Africa has consistently profitted from Banda's desire to prove that "the white people in the Republic are not the ogres that the newspapers make out..."

The most obvious comfort Banda's "dialogue" has given to the South Africans has been the disunity it has provoked within the forums of independent Africa. From the earliest days of independence, Banda refused to support Organisation of African Unity resolutions against South Africa, and actively encouraged other African leaders to follow suit. In response the OAU passed a resolution denouncing "manoeuvres" by South Africa "aimed at seducing certain independent African states by economic and financial offers".<sup>9</sup> But by 1970 the issue of dialogue had caused deep and open divisions amongst the member states. Much influenced by Malawi, the President of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet-Boigny, called for a "progressive solution" and advocated direct contact with South Africa. The ensuing debates gave South Africa more opportunities to dismiss the significance and influence of bodies such as the OAU.

One of the most controversial defences of South Africa by Banda has been his support for the arming of the apartheid regime. In 1968 he told the Malawi Parliament: "So South Africa is building her own planes, her own submarines, her own everything, even missiles. For myself, Good Luck. I have nothing against her because I know that South Africa threatens no one. Therefore to me, very, very good luck, even more, more."<sup>10</sup>

The issue surfaced again at the Commonwealth Summit meeting in 1970, when

Malawi was the only country to support Britain's decision to sell arms to South Africa. Banda argued that it was "arrant nonsense" to believe that South Africa would use weapons either for internal repression, or against African states north of the Zambezi. His arguments were backed up with the threat of "Communist Imperialism" and its apparent penetration of Africa. He declared that he would rather see Britain supply arms to South Africa, than let the Indian Ocean "become a private swimming-pool of a hostile power".<sup>11</sup> This argument was particularly well received in South Africa. One South African reporter commentated:

"Dr Banda has put his finger right on the cardinal point at issue in the present controversy over the supply of arms to South Africa... Very few African leaders have yet realised the tremendous communist penetration of Africa. Dr Banda is one."<sup>12</sup>

The most spectacular event in Malawi's dialogue with South Africa was Banda's state visit to South Africa in August 1971. The previous year the Prime Minister of South Africa, John Vorster, had visited Malawi and encouraged Banda to reciprocate. Thus the pair both entered the record books, Vorster being the first South African premier to visit an independent African country, and Banda the first Black leader to be welcomed in South Africa. The event provided a field-day for the propagandist of the apartheid regime, and was presented as proof that apartheid was acceptable even to Blacks. Banda claimed that the visit "had made black and white rub shoulders with each other", and that it had shown the white population of South Africa a "true image of an African ... a responsible Head of State".<sup>13</sup>

Ten years later, Banda still openly justifies his contacts with the South African regime. Economically, Malawi is deeply dependent on South Africa, which supplies 41% of her imports. Banda is propped up by large sums of money from South Africa in the form of soft loans. In December 1980, the editorial in Malawi's *Daily Times*, the government-controlled newspaper, hailed Malawi's relationship with South Africa, commenting that President Banda's policy of dialogue had "transformed political barriers on the international scene".<sup>14</sup>

Yet the southern Africa of the 1980s is marked by a dramatically changed balance of power. Since the independence of Zimbabwe, Banda's desire for dialogue has been entirely discredited, and the danger of Malawi's isolation is much greater. Hence it seems surprising that Banda remains unrepentant and continues to maintain a level of cooperation with the South African regime that is gravely condemned by Malawi's independent neighbours. Indeed, given the new attempt by the liberated states of southern Africa to break free from South Africa's regional domination through the formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference — of which Malawi is a member — it is all the more remarkable that Malawi is still prepared to collaborate with Pretoria.

#### Notes to Chapter Four

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## Chapter Five

### African Alternatives

The previous chapters have outlined the danger that South Africa poses to the region. But independent southern Africa has not been a passive object, manipulated and mutilated at will by the apartheid regime. Despite South Africa's economic and military strength, backed as it is by the multinational companies and the West, a concerted attempt has been made to break away from South Africa's grasp.

The first major public declaration of opposition to the domination of southern Africa by minority-ruled regimes was the signing of the Lusaka Manifesto in March 1969. The Manifesto brought together the group of countries that came to be known as the "frontline states". Their task then was awe-inspiring. Mozambique and Angola were still considered by Portugal to be integral parts of its territory; Rhodesia was a British colony in rebellion; Namibia was firmly ruled from Pretoria, and South Africa itself had successfully driven the parties representing the majority of its population underground and into exile. Despite the odds against them, the peoples of the minority-ruled states have fought for their liberation. Today Pretoria stands alone in the region, its control over Namibia sharply contested by SWAPO, and its rule at home beset by crisis. Mozambique, Angola and finally Zimbabwe have joined the frontline states.

Nevertheless, as earlier chapters have outlined, South Africa has been able to use her military, political and economic strength to limit the independence of her neighbours. The launching of Botha's "Constellation of States" gave added momentum to the growing realisation among the frontline states that their economic dependence on South Africa compromised their political freedom. A determination was born to use the unity forged in the political struggle to fight for economic independence. As Samora Machel, President of Mozambique, was to put it: "The experience of unity and cohesion of the frontline states in the political liberation struggle of the people should be extended to other majority-ruled states and governments in southern Africa in economic liberation."<sup>1</sup>

### The Southern African Development Coordination Conference

The concept of economic cooperation in an African context is not new. The Central African Federation — essentially an attempt to maintain white domination — united Northern and Southern Rhodesia with Nyasaland. The East African Community provided economic links between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Both

collapsed, although for very different reasons. In April 1978, at a meeting in Lusaka, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa proposed a sphere of cooperation in Southern and Eastern Africa. Then in June 1979 a meeting of representatives of the former Portuguese colonies took place in Luanda, in an effort to strengthen solidarity between them. At the same time a series of bilateral commissions had been set up to promote and manage co-operation between Tanzania and Mozambique, Mozambique and Zambia, Zambia and Angola, and Tanzania and Zambia.<sup>2</sup> Finally, in May 1979 the foreign ministers of the frontline states met in Gaborone, Botswana, to take a formal decision to set up the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC).

The first meeting — SADCC 1 — took place in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979. At that meeting the states were joined by a number of members of international organisations, and studies were presented covering potential areas of regional cooperation. Despite a high level of concern, the overriding focus of attention at the time was the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. Further progress had to await the outcome of the Lancaster House talks in February 1980 and the independence elections.

With this achieved, a summit was held in Lusaka on 1 April 1980 at which, for the first time, all the states presently making up SADCC could be present. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Malawi were officially represented. The Lusaka declaration — "Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation" — was adopted, and an eight-point programme for economic development was endorsed. This included a Southern African Transport and Communications Commission based in Maputo; a regional food and security plan; a regional agricultural research centre specialising in the problems of drought; greater industrial and energy cooperation; measures to control foot-and-mouth disease; regional training facilities and a regional development fund.

The plans were ambitious and the need for finance was enormous. Central to the proposals, and receiving first priority, are the plans for the Transport and Communications Commission. A 300-page study funded by the Swedish International Development Agency outlined the projects, and divided them into categories. The 95 projects listed cost a total of US \$1.9 billion. Of these 43, costing \$1.53 billion, were for rehabilitating existing facilities and 44% of this sum was required to upgrade and rehabilitate the three ports and the rail system of Mozambique, something that all participants see as pivotal to regional independence. It was therefore fitting that SADCC 2 was held in the Mozambique capital, Maputo, in November 1980. At that conference \$650 million was pledged as well as certain unspecified promises of future cooperation. The full table of pledges is listed below.

TABLE TWO  
PLEDGES OF FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT  
TO SADCC PROGRAMME OF ACTION

Country/Organisation	1980/81 and 1981/82	US \$ 1982-1986 million	
Sweden	US \$ (11 + 11)m	22.00	Subject to Projects
Netherlands	US \$ (16 + 16)m	32.00	Subject to Projects
Norway		6.00	Subject to Projects
Finland		6.00	Subject to Projects
Denmark		10.00	Subject to Projects
U.S.A.	US \$ (25 + 25)m	50.00	Subject to Projects
Italy		15.00	Subject to Projects
Federal Republic of Germany	US \$ 276.50 + 380.00m	2.00	Subject to Projects
G.D.R.	Unquantified support		
Australia	(2 specified Civil Aviation studies)	1.00	
Belgium		8.50	Subject to Projects
U.K.			Bilateral Programmes
Switzerland	Technical Assistance		Subject to Projects
Canada	Technical Assistance	unspecified	Subject to Projects
Austria	Technical assistance	unspecified	Subject to Projects
Yugoslavia	Studies		Export Credit
Brazil			Export Credit
Venezuela	Subject to Request		Subject to Requests
Japan	No commitment		No commitment
France	Studies		Export Credit
African Development Bank	Technical Assistance	4.00	US \$380.00
EEC	Spread over 5 years	100.00	
UNDP	US \$15-20m over 5 years	20.00	
Kuwait Fund	Unspecified Technical		Subject to Projects
OPEC Fund			Subject to Projects
BADEA	Unspecified Technical Assistance		Further Technical Assistance
World Bank	Studies in Food Security and Livestock Diseases		Subject to Projects
<b>TOTAL PLEDGES</b>	<b>US \$ 276.50m + 380.00m = US\$ 656.50m</b>		

NB: Although other countries did not announce specific sums of money for

SADCC they expressed great support and offered to provide financial assistance after agreement on specific projects.

Source: News Bulletin, No.2, *Zimbabwe Project*, London, January 1981.

#### SADCC — an interim assessment

SADCC is an attempt to build on the political unity forged during the liberation struggle, but maintaining the unity for economic ends is fraught with difficulty. The states committed to SADCC are very different politically; they have had very different colonial experiences, and have come to independence by very different routes. The Conference includes countries which have capitalist economies, such as Swaziland and Botswana, as well as those that claim to follow a variant of African Socialism, and states such as Mozambique and Angola, guided by Marxism-Leninism. Swaziland is a monarchy, Botswana a multiparty democracy and Malawi a dictatorship. While all suffer from South Africa's domination, some are more willing prisoners than others. Indeed, at the Lusaka meeting pointed remarks were made about Malawi as being potentially a "fifth column" in the ranks of the frontline states. Speaking to the European Parliament in October 1980, Botswanan President, Dr Q. Masire observed: "We do not ignore social political and economic differences among us, or gloss over divergences of opinion. But such differences were overcome in the efforts of the frontline states in support of the liberation of Zimbabwe."<sup>3</sup> Trying to unite for a common purpose always presents considerable problems. As Samora Machel put it:

"The increase in cooperation and in particular the coordination of development efforts is not a simple nor an easy task. Many attempts were made in different regions and at different times. The history of Africa is unhappily rich in examples of attempts that failed... Therefore, we must be humble in our immediate objectives and ambitious in our long-term objectives."<sup>4</sup>

Perhaps the greatest danger to economic unity is the possibility that one state should gain disproportionately at the expense of its neighbours. Accordingly, each project that has been proposed must stand on its own merits. It has been pointed out that the majority of the \$650 million promised at SADCC 2 consists of resources already pledged to an individual country by an aid donor. Hence little of the aid is "new" in the sense of being generated in response to the appeal made jointly by the states making up SADCC. This criticism misses the point since, as one SADCC document put it: "The strategy is one of the coordination, harmonisation and selective integration..."<sup>5</sup> The aim is to eliminate duplication and waste, while at the same time generating collective support for projects that the individual countries would in any case wish to see.

SADCC is a strategy that rejects the creation of a new and expensive



bureaucracy — indeed it has so far been run on a shoestring — or the creation of a free trade zone along the lines of the EEC. While wishing to increase their mutual interdependence, the states are aware that their economies are still too delicate to allow unfettered trade, which could only be achieved over an extended period. Even then it will be necessary for the relative costs of each project to be assessed. Consider, for example, the possible trade between Mozambique and Tanzania. In a free trade zone, surrounded by quotas and tariff barriers, it might be possible to exchange Tanzanian textiles for Mozambiquan cement. But both countries would have to assess the relative advantage of such a transaction against the possibility that it might be cheaper to import each product from Europe or Japan. Cooperation will have to make long-term economic sense to all the countries concerned.

While the problems facing SADCC are considerable, there is also reason for optimism. The first reason is a negative one — the necessity to answer as forcefully as possible the challenge posed by South Africa's "Constellation of States" proposal. If unanswered, the states of the region could have been picked off by South Africa one by one and subjected to further pressure. But it has been made clear that SADCC is not a declaration of economic war on South Africa. It is an attempt to reduce decency — not a threat of economic confrontation. Nevertheless, the states anticipate a sharp reaction. As the late Sir S. Khama put it "The struggle for economic liberation will be as bitterly contested as has been the struggle for political liberation."<sup>6</sup>

South Africa certainly serves as a focus of opposition, but SADCC is not solely concerned with reducing dependence on South Africa. The region has a population of 60 million and a Gross Domestic Product of US \$20,000 million. By harnessing their joint resources, the members hope to improve their collective bargaining position in relation to the rest of the world. They hope to minimise the danger that the West will attempt to play off one against the other as it has so often in its dealings with the "Third World". A joint reaction to the multinationals could also prove to be useful.

Finally, the strategy of regional cooperation is in line with the development plan outlined at the Organisation of African Unity economic summit held in Lagos in April 1980. Regional cooperation is seen as a prelude to a continental preferential trade arrangement by 1984, and an African Economic Community by the year 2000. SADCC could prove a useful testing ground for this vision.

However, despite all the evidence goodwill and realism generated by SADCC 2, international commitment to its aims is minimal.<sup>7</sup> Nor is it surprising that the reaction should be so luke-warm. In many ways SADCC 2 threw the major powers off their guard, for it represented a reversal of roles. Instead of the donors providing the aid for projects that they had identified, the SADCC countries defined their own priorities. President Machel insisted that: "There is no one better than ourselves that know our needs and priorities. We must not accept the habit of plans made

outside our region."

It is perhaps the air of determination and urgency that is the most hopeful sign for the SADCC initiative. SADCC has issued this challenge: "The cynics were wrong when they underestimated the commitment to political liberation. They will be wrong again if they believe that SADCC is not truly embarked on the road to *Economic Liberation*."<sup>8</sup>

The fate of the peoples of southern Africa will be largely determined by the manner in which this challenge is met.

### The Military Options

While SADCC is an attempt to solve some of the long term structural problems of economic dependency, the immediate future of South Africa's neighbours is tied up with the need to develop a defence against the escalating number of South African attacks. There are two broad areas of defensive operations.

Firstly, as has been shown in chapter two, the favourite South African tactics is to use few South African Defence Force troops in attacks and to rely mainly on surrogates like UNITA in Angola and MRN in Mozambique. These surrogates are drawn from disaffected groups within each country. One strategy for undermining the South African influence with such groups is to meet their material needs. MPLA found in the high plateau, where UNITA had support, that when the local people saw that the MPLA administration of the villages brought not a reign of terror, as UNITA had warned, but peace and prosperity, they began to desert the UNITA strongholds in the bush and return to the villages.

Secondly, many of the South African attacks on her neighbours continue to be unreported and unremarked upon internationally. While the fighting on the ground falls to the people of each country, international support and solidarity is of crucial importance. Attacks on Zambia, Mozambique and Angola have been raised in debates at the United Nations. It appears that the accumulation of criticism there against South African attacks on frontline states forced the Reagan administration to make statements that seemed to show a change in US policy on South Africa. However Reagan is still pressing for an end to the embargo on arms sales to the rebel forces in Angola and we have recently had menacing statements by US state department officials pledging support for the Apartheid regime.

The diplomatic criticism of South Africa in a forum like the UN needs to be based on local initiatives that expose South Africa's war and reinforce her isolation. Various political parties and trade unions have made calls for sanctions against South Africa. The continuation of such efforts, especially in the field of oil sanctions and an embargo on the transmission of military, scientific and technical information to South Africa can only help to limit her capability to attack her neighbours.

### Conclusion

SADCC, the various military and diplomatic efforts against South Africa are born,



*South African Prime Minister P. W. Botha, photographed with Jonas Savembi of Unita, inside Angola in 1975. Botha, then Minister of Defence, is accompanied by M. Malan.*

like South Africa's aggression against her neighbours, out of the need of the South African ruling class to maintain its wealth and power. The best allies of South Africa's neighbours are the people of South Africa, opposed to that ruling class and dedicated to the ending of apartheid. The security of the frontline states is intimately linked with the success of SWAPO in Namibia in establishing an independent government. For the whole region lasting peace can only be secured by the destruction of the Apartheid Regime in South Africa.

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## Appendix

Country	Area sq km	Population	Independence	GNP Total \$ million	GNP per cap \$	Main Exports
Angola	1,246,000	6,350,000	November 1975	1,970	330	coffee, crude oil, diamonds
Botswana	570,000	690,000	September 1966	300	40	diamonds, copper, nickel, beef
Lesotho	30,355	1,200,000	October 1966	300	230	wool, mohair, labour power
Malawi	94,080	5,570,000	July 1964	800	140	tobacco, tea, sugar
Mozambique	783,030	9,400,000	June 1975	1,470	150	sugar, tea, cotton, coal, shrimps, cashew nuts
Tanzania	945,097	17,500,000	December 1961	3,100	200	coffee, cotton, sisal
Swaziland	17,363	527,791	September 1968	310	580	iron ore, asbestos, coal
Zambia	752,614	5,470,000	October 1964	2,330	450	copper, zinc, cobalt, tobacco
Zimbabwe	389,700	6,390,000	April 1980	3,360*	500	tobacco, beef, tea, chrome

\* (1977)

Source: New African Yearbook 1980

Note: All figures should be treated as estimates

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## Contact addresses

### Solidarity Movements based in Britain.

Anti-Apartheid Movement  
89 Charlotte St., London W1. Tel: 01-580-5311

International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa  
104 Newgate Street, London EC1A 7AP Tel: 01-606-6123.

Liberation  
313 Caledonian Road, London N1. Tel: 01-607-0465.

Malawi Support Committee  
Star House, 57 Church Road, Richmond Surrey

Mozambique, Angola and Guine Information Centre (MAGIC)  
34 Percy Street, London W1P 9FG. Tel: 01-636-7108.

Namibia Support Committee  
188 North Gower Street, London NW1 Tel: 01-388-5539.

SADCC Liaison Committee  
1 Cambridge Terrace, London NW1 4JL.

War and Want  
467 Caledonian Road, London N7 9BE. Tel: 01-609 0211

Liberation Movements recognised by the Organisation of African Unity  
African National Congress of South Africa (ANC)  
PO Box 38, 28 Penton St., London N1 9PR. Tel: 01-837-2012.

Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)  
212 Church Road, Willesden, London NW10 9NP. Tel: 01-451-0573.

South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO)  
188 North Gower Street, London NW1. Tel: 01-388-2089.

Dear Friend,

I am asking you to join Liberation and/or to ask your organisation to affiliate to it.

Liberation has a history going back 50 years. The movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF) which it incorporates was responsible for helping to launch the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Campaigns for Peace in Vietnam, Algeria, and Nigeria, the Chile Solidarity Committee and War on Want.

Liberation remains the only all-embracing, anti-imperialist organisation in this country. It makes its services available, as far as it is possible, to all those struggling for freedom whether it is in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Turkey, Iran or Southern Africa. All those fighting imperialism look to us for support and we are tremendously concerned that in the Third World millions face starvation. Our two conferences on the need for a new international economic order has aroused great interest.

At the same time we are equally concerned about racism in this country. As part of our work on multi-racial education, we have sponsored *Young World Books*. The much respected *Children's Book Bulletin* has described this as 'perhaps the most exciting development in children's book publishing in Britain of the last year'.

I hope you will fill in the form below and add a donation if you can as our fees are not sufficient to finance our activities.

Yours sincerely,

President: Fenner Brockway  
Chairman: Stan Newens, MP

Treasurer: Arthur Latham  
General Secretary: Tony Gilbert

Affiliation Fees, which include subscription to our journal are:

Local Organisations, £3.00. Trades Councils and other District Organisations, £5.00.  
Student Organisations, £5.00. National Bodies, £10.50 — £100, by negotiation.  
Individual Members, £4.00. Unwaged £2.50.

Please fill in the appropriate section of the form below:

### AFFILIATIONS

I enclose the sum of £ ..... affiliation fee, and a donation of £.....

ORGANISATION AND BRANCH.....

ADDRESS .....

..... TELEPHONE .....

SECRETARY.....

### INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS

I enclose the sum of £ ..... Membership fee, and a donation of £ .....

NAME.....

ADDRESS .....

..... TELEPHONE .....

RETURN TO: The General Secretary, Liberation, 313/5 Caledonian Road,  
London, N1 (01-607 0465)

## Support War on Want

Your support is important.

If we are to continue to fight back against poverty, to encourage initiatives that develop self-reliance, to expose the causes of poverty — we need **your help now**.

- A **donation** will help to maintain our current programme of activity.
- Join us. **Become a War on Want member.** Help us to decide War on Want's future policies. For only £5 a year (£1 for OAPs/Claimants/Students) you can participate fully in the organisation, vote (or stand) for the Council of Management which governs the organisation, attend general meetings and receive regular mailings about our activities.
- Encourage your trade union, community group or local organisation to take out **affiliate membership**. The minimum yearly fee is £5. That entitles the affiliate to voting representation at general meetings and to receive regular mailings.
- Make a long term commitment to War on Want, with a **banker's order**. This will enable us to plan for the future with guaranteed income.
- Make that long term commitment worth over 40% extra. Take out a **covenant**, and we can reclaim from Inland Revenue the standard rate of tax you have paid on the donation. Covenants run for four years and are the most effective way of supporting War on Want.
- A **legacy** ensures the continuation of the fight against poverty. All it requires is the addition of this simple codicil to your will:  
"I hereby bequeath the sum of . . . . . pounds free of duty to War on Want, 467 Caledonian Road, London N7 9BE, for the campaign against world poverty and I direct that the receipt of the General Secretary of the society shall be a good discharge for such a legacy."

Whichever form of support you choose, make your decision **today**. The fight against poverty is too important to wait.

cut here

### Donation Form

I enclose £. . . . . as a donation for the work of War on Want.

I wish this donation to go towards: (please tick relevant boxes)

- War on Want's General Fund E. . . . .  
 War on Want's General Overseas Fund E. . . . .  
 War on Want's UK Project Fund E. . . . .

Name . . . . .

Address . . . . .

Please tick if you require a receipt.

Please return to:

**War on Want**

**Room YR, 467 Caledonian Road, London N7 9BE**

### Membership Form

I support War on Want's campaign and wish to become a member.

I enclose £. . . . . to cover my first year's subscription.

Signature . . . . .

Name . . . . .

Address . . . . .

**Affiliate Membership:** We support War on Want's campaign and wish to become affiliated. We enclose £. . . . . to cover our first year's subscription.

Name of organisation . . . . .

Address . . . . .

Name of contact . . . . .

Please return to:

**War on Want**

**Room YR, 467 Caledonian Road, London N7 9BE**